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The objectives of this paper are to examine the impact of liberalization on trade deficits and
current accounts for developing economies. Attempts at liberalization in trade could lead to an
increase in imports in the short run and this could cause both trade and current account deficits
in countries that adopt rapid liberalization. Liberalization could increase growth rates in the
short run and this also could result into higher imports than exports. The study examines the
data of 64 developing economies over the period 1970–99 and conducts a panel data study on
the relationship between trade balance to GDP percentages with the growth rates controlling for
other factors. Similar analysis is conducted using the current account to GDP percentages in the
panel data framework. We consider the endogeneity of growth variable and lagged effects
through a dynamic structure. We find that higher growth rates in developing economies result in
greater trade and current account deficits although the sensitivity of such trade deficits to growth
rates is not high. The higher growth rate in developed countries and improvement in income
terms of trade of developing economies tends to reduce trade deficits and current account
deficits of developing economies. Liberalization on its own has positive impact but combined
with income terms of trade yields a negative overall impact on trade balance to GDP
percentages. The impact of improvement in terms of trade and the higher growth in developed
countries seems to play a greater role in improving trade balances than the corresponding
deterioration induced by higher growth in developing economies.
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UNCTAD Database. All of them confirm the negative relationship between trade
balance to GDP (percentages) and economic growth in a domestic economy.
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Introduction
A current account deficit can be defined as the country’s excess of investment over
savings. However, the saving and investment flows reported in many national income
accounts do not conform closely to the theoretically correct concepts of saving and
investment when international capital mobility is extensive. Historically, current
account balances were slight in post-1945 period initially because of official restrictions
on international capital movements, with most industrialised countries’ currencies
inconvertible until 1959. After the early 1970s net international capital flows have
expanded as a result of petrodollar recycling, the removal of many industrial country
restrictions on international payments following the adoption of floating exchange rates
and technological evolution in the financial industry.
There is a plausible link between economic growth and the external balance, and this
was noted in the literature on two-gap models (Chenery and Bruno 1962) in 1960 and
the balance of payments constrained economic growth (Thirlwall 1979). In the two-gap
models, the first one relates to the resources needed for investment as external capital
flows permit developing countries to invest more than their domestic savings. This
alone is sometimes not sufficient to accelerate capital accumulation and economic
growth because the foreign exchange gap becomes dominant. Both investment and
growth in developing countries are dependent on imported intermediate and capital
goods. It is probable that even if domestic savings are sufficient to finance all the
investment, a developing country may not be able to carry out investment projects if the
foreign exchange available to run the projects is not adequate. Investment in this
instance would be lower than the one that could be financed by savings generated at full
employment of existing resources. Hence, the production capacity would be
underutilized and income and savings would be reduced. Capital inflows can reduce the
foreign exchange gap, allowing imports, investment and savings to be raised above the
levels constrained by export earnings. The balance of payments constrained model of
growth predicts that the rate of the growth of a country is equal to the rate of growth of
the volume of exports divided by the income elasticity of demand for imports. Both
these approaches are largely static and do not adequately capture the link between trade
and economic growth. In the dynamic context, the role of exports is not only to earn
extra foreign exchange but also to create the domestic market because the latter would
allow the industry to operate at full capacity while the former would generate surplus
foreign exchange. Export expansion depends upon investment; a sustainable growth
process requires dynamic interactions between capital accumulation and exports. In the
dynamic process, exports, savings and investment all increase, in absolute terms but
initially the savings and foreign exchange gaps tend to be large but over time they
should become narrow as domestic savings and exports grow faster than imports and
investment. Thus, the economy can continue to grow rapidly despite a relative decline
in real resource transfers from abroad. In this respect, we need to focus on a dynamic
framework where intertemporal utility maximization subject to current account
constraint is considered. One of the conclusions of these models is to explain the
smoothed consumption behaviour over time. A country’s trade performance is
influenced by a large number of domestic factors including its structural characteristics,2
resource endowments and policies. External economic environment is no less important
in determining the country’s trade balance. These vary considerably from country to
country and a full account of such influences requires detailed country specific analysis.
As the detailed country analysis is not the purpose of this study the scope of this
research is confined to examine the impact of a number of common factors namely the
global demand, terms of trade, trade and financial liberalization and exchange rate
regimes on the trade-balance to GDP percentages. These factors would have presumably
influenced the trade and growth performance of a large number of low and medium
income developing countries. Slow growth of the developed countries’ markets,
continued restrictions of access in areas of export interest to developing countries tend
to add to trade deficits in developing countries by slowing the pace of their export
earnings and leading to terms of trade losses. Trade liberalization widens the deficits as
in the short run this produces an upsurge in imports where protection was excessive and
the import-substitution strategies were not successful. The lack of coordination between
exchange rate management and trade liberalization can lead to trade deficit. Financial
liberalization leading to capital account liberalization tends to aggravate payments
difficulties by discouraging investment in traded-goods industries.
The objectives of this study are to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of
trade balance and GDP growth relationship and incorporate several exogenous global
factors that can have influence on the balance of payments. The other objective is to
examine and assess quantitatively the impact of trade liberalization for 14 selected
economies that have liberalized at different points of time during the period 1970–91.
As our quantitative analysis covers a large number of African, Asian and Latin
American developing economies, we use panel data since we want to study the
behavioural relationship between trade balance and GDP growth under liberalization,
changes in terms of trade and growth in world market demand. As the growth of GDP
and trade balance are endogenous variables we propose to estimate the model equation
by using instrumental variable estimation for panel data. It is also proposed to look at
policies to alleviate the effects of trade and financial liberalization on trade deficits of
developing economies. A part of the study is also using dynamic models on panel data
and tries to account for endogeneity of the country’s growth variable by using
instruments.
In Section 1, we review the long-term trends while in Section 2, we consider two gap
models and intertemporal framework to examine the consumption smoothing
phenomenon and the consequent sustainable current account deficits. In Section 3, we
study the impact of liberalization and other factors on trade balance to GDP percentages
for 14 developing economies. These economies are from 3 different geographical
regions so we do separate study for each region in latter section in case there is a large
structural difference among the regions. Also, the study is extended to 64 developing
economies over the period 1970–99 and a relationship is derived between trade balance
and GDP growth. In Section 4, we treat trade balance-GDP percentage and domestic
growth as endogenous variables and estimate a trade balance to GDP relationship using
panel data instrumental-variable-techniques. In Section 5, we estimate the relationship
between trade balance to GDP percentage and growth by regions. A similar model is
estimated for the relationship between current account to GDP percentages and
economic growth for each region namely Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the final3
concluding section we provide summary conclusions with some limitations of the study.
Appendix lists the mean values by countries for dependent variables (trade balance and
current account deficits to GDP) and domestic economic growth for each of the 64
countries.




1.1  All developing countries and territories
The ratio of the current-account deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) has been
relatively stable for the group of developing countries
2
 taken as a group over the past
decade and a half although it has fluctuated between one and three per cent (Figure 1).
This contrasts sharply with the 1970s, where developing countries faced strong
fluctuations in their current account but experienced a surplus in most of the years.
Developing countries’ trade account has moved by and large in parallel with their
current account. It is noteworthy, however, that the early 1990s was the first period
during which developing countries had a trade deficit for several consecutive years.
This has caused the average (group) trade-account position to be worse during the 1990s
than in previous periods, with an only slight difference compared with the 1980s but a
very large one compared with the 1970s. The rate of growth in developing countries has
fluctuated substantially over the past three decades: an average growth rate of about six
per cent – but with significant fluctuations around a downward trend – during the 1970s
was followed by a sharp drop in GDP-growth at the beginning of the 1980s. GDP-
growth was relatively stable at around three to four per cent during the second half of
the 1980s and subsequently rose to an average of about five per cent during the first half
of the 1990s. Taking the evidence on external deficits and GDP-growth together
suggests that for developing countries the external deficits and financial requirements
associated with any given growth rate have been larger over the past few years
compared to earlier periods.
The evolution of the world market price for crude oil has strongly influenced the
external position and rate of growth of developing countries, with significantly different
implications for fuel- and non-fuel-exporting countries. The difference in the experience
between these two country groups has of course been marked most in the years
immediately following the two oil-price hikes in 1973 and 1979 but has been very
distinct also over the past few years when the price of oil declined drastically. Given the
strong dependence of the major fuel-exporting developing countries on just one export
item with a strongly fluctuating price on the world market, they face very specific
problems. Therefore, the remainder of this analysis will focus on non-fuel exporting
                                                  
1  A large part of the Section 1 is presented in UNCTAD (1999) Trade and Development Report. I am
grateful to Dr Jörg Mayer for his analysis of issues of a large number of developing countries and their
trade policy.
2 Given that data on the current account for the 1970s with a comprehensive coverage of developing
countries is available only from the IMF’s World Development Outlook database, this section makes
use of the IMF’s country group convention, i.e. Hong Kong, China SAE, the Republic of Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan, Province of China are not included in the group of developing countries.4
developing countries. The People’s Republic of China will also be excluded from the
following analysis for two reasons. First, China may be characterized best as an
economy in transition which over the past few years has undergone a change in nature
of the way in which the economy functions comparable to that of the transition
economies in Central and Eastern Europe which are also excluded from the analysis.
Secondly, given that China alone accounts for about 15 per cent of GDP of all
developing countries; its external accounts have often moved opposite to those of the
group of developing countries as a whole and China’s growth rate has been very
substantially higher than that of most other developing countries over the past few
years, its inclusion would introduce a bias to the analysis. But while the described
pattern for non-fuel exporting developing countries is more pronounced if China is
excluded, the overall picture does not change if China is included in the analysis.
1.2  Non-fuel exporting developing countries excluding China
Three distinct phases have characterised the evolution of GDP growth and the external
accounts of non-fuel-exporting developing countries excluding China since 1970:
—  a deterioration in the period between 1970 and the early 1980s which was
particularly pronounced in the years immediately following the two oil price
shocks (i.e. 1974–75 and 1980–81). The deterioration of the external accounts
during the 1970s was not associated with a concomitant decline of growth
partly because these deficits could be financed relatively easily given that
international capital from commercial sources began to assume a large role
since commercial lending was the prime channel to recycle petro dollars.
—  a strong improvement between 1982 and 1987–88: this was a period of, first,
adjustment and, then, recovery. Developing countries registered a swing in
their external accounts by 3 to 4 percentage points of GDP and balanced their
trade account towards the end of this period. While the improvement in the
external accounts during the crisis and adjustment period of the early-1980s
were associated mainly with import compression and falling growth, the
relationship between external account and growth became virtuous and very
unusual for the short period between 1983 and 1985 when external accounts
improved with rising growth.
—  a strong deterioration in the external position between 1987–88 and the mid-
1990s with a swing back to a deficit level similar to that during the 1970s. Two
features of the post-1987 period stand out. (i) The period 1987–90 was
characterized by increasing external deficits and slowing growth, i.e. a
constellation, which is clearly unsustainable in the long run. During this period
many developing countries also underwent a regime change in their trade
policy in the sense that they dismantled quantitative restrictions and reduced
tariffs, and that they maintained this stance in spite of a worsening trade
account. In other words, they stopped using trade policy measures for balance-
of-payments purposes. (ii) Even though economic growth in developing
countries picked up moderately after 1990, the rates achieved are associated
with higher GDP-ratios of their external deficits than in previous periods. This
means that over the past decade there has been an increase in the external5
financing requirement associated with any given growth rate. As a matter of
fact, the relationship between growth and the external position of the past few
years mimics that of the period prior to the economic crisis of the early-1980s.
The evolution of the current account  position in the non-fuel-exporting-developing
countries excluding China has been largely determined by the evolution of their trade
and income accounts, while their balances on services and current transfers have not
been subject to important changes over the past three decades.
3
 During the 1970s and
the 1990s, high trade deficits were the main factor behind the rising current account
deficit. By contrast, the rising burden of interest payments associated with developing
countries’ rising external indebtedness caused a strong deterioration in their incomes’
account during the early-1980s. They contained the consequent deterioration of their
current account by an improvement in their trade account (as can be seen in Figure 1 by
the increased difference between the current and the trade account during the 1980s).
4
Figure 2 uses mean values of trade balance and current account deficits to GDP
percentages. It can be seen that there is an increased difference between current account
and trade deficits after 1990. Similarly in Figure 3, the World Economic Outlook
(WEO) are used for the aggregate group of developing countries including fuel
economies. The decline in world interest rates since 1989 has reduced the pressure of
debt service payments on the current account but this has not translated into lower
current-account deficits due to the renewed deterioration in the trade account.
A comparison of the average external positions and growth rates for these three periods
reveals a similar general pattern for developing countries as a whole, as well as for
several sub-groups thereof.
5
 Between the 1970s and the 1980s, developing countries
reduced their external trade deficits by about 2–3 percentage points but experienced a
drop in the rate of growth by about two percentage points; by contrast, between the
1980s and the 1990s, their trade deficits increased strongly with the rate of growth
remaining by and large unchanged. There are a few notable exceptions from this basic
pattern of a similar deficit/GDP ratio and a lower growth rate in the 1990s compared
with the 1970s:
—  the average external trade position of developing countries including the major
fuel-exporting countries has worsened throughout the period;
                                                  
3 The GDP-ratio of the services account has fluctuated between 0 and –0.5 per cent, while that of the
current transfers has fluctuated between 1.5 and 2.0 per cent. With the fuel-exporting developing
countries included, the average services/GDP ratio becomes –0.8 to –3.0 per cent and that of the
current transfer/GDP ratio 0 to 0.8 per cent. For detailed empirical evidence, see Table A31 in
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, various issues.
4 Fuel-exporting developing countries experienced a sharp deterioration in the  services account
following the first oil-price shock, which explains why in Figure 1 the discrepancy between the GDP
ratios of the trade deficit and the current-account deficit widened already during the second half of the
1970s.
5 Given the fact that for many countries country-specific data on the current account are available only
from the mid-1980s onwards, the argument presented in this paragraph refer only to the trade account.
However, since the available data at the aggregate level shows that trade and current account positions
have moved by and large in parallel, it seems reasonable to assume that the following argumentation
also applies to the current account.6
—  the group of non-fuel exporting countries in sub-Saharan Africa has
experienced a worsening of both its external position and its growth rate;
—  the group of non-fuel developing Asia excluding China raised its growth rate
while improving its external position during the 1980s; it is the only region for
which the relationship in the first half of the 1990s is not substantially different
from that in the 1970s.
Similar movements in the trade account/GDP ratios can be caused by different trends in
exports and imports. Export and import value indices give some indication as to whether
an improvement in a trade balance of the country was achieved by an increase in
exports, a decrease in imports, or both. Statistical evidence shows that after a continuous
increase of both exports and imports of developing countries during the 1970s, their
exports stagnated and their imports dropped during the first half of the 1980s. By
contrast, both imports and exports have risen strongly since 1986. Looking at regional
sub-groups suggests that the drastic improvement in the trade balance of non-fuel
Developing America during the 1980s were due to a slight increase in exports but
mainly due to a very substantial compression of imports. This contrasts sharply with the
experience of non-fuel Developing Asia excluding China whose trade balance improved
in the 1980s due mainly to a very strong increase in exports-contrary to Developing
America, imports also increased. Hence, while import compression is likely to have
choked economic growth in Developing America, rising imports were associated with
rising growth and rising exports in Developing Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa is the other
developing region that experienced strong import compression during the 1980s and,
contrary to the situation in Developing America, this experience has not very much
improved over the past few years.
1.3 Individual country experience
The pattern of adjustment regarding the combination between the external trade position
and growth has not been uniform across developing countries. As already mentioned, it
can be expected that rising (falling) growth is associated with a deteriorating
(improving) trade account/GDP ratio. An improving trade account/GDP ratio
accompanied by rising growth may be called an unusual and virtuous combination,
while falling growth accompanied by a deteriorating trade account / GDP ratio is clearly
unsustainable. Given that a good part of the 1980s can be considered as a period of
crisis and adjustment and hence as exceptional for developing countries, it appears most
appropriate to compare the past few years with the 1970s.
Looking at trends in external trade and growth at the level of individual developing
countries shows that 34 out of the 84 countries which are included in the analysis have
had on average a worse position in both external trade and growth over the past few
years compared to the 1970s; 23 countries have had the ‘normal’ but adverse experience
of an improving trade position and falling growth, 18 countries had the ‘normal’ and
positive experience of rising growth combined with a deteriorating trade position, while
only 9 developing countries have succeeded in improving both the external trade
position and GDP growth (see Table 1). Given that sub-Saharan Africa has performed
significantly worse than any other developing region over the past decade or two, it is
not surprising that with 15 almost half of the 34 countries with an unsustainable position7
are in that region. However, it is noteworthy that with Colombia, Egypt, the Philippines
and Turkey four of the biggest developing countries are also in this group.
Comparing individual country experience between the 1970s and the 1990s with that
between the 1980s and the 1990s (Tables 1 and 2) shows that during each of the periods
the external trade position deteriorated in the majority of countries, while the majority
of countries experienced rising growth rates between the 1980s and the 1990s.
However, 15 out of the 29 countries with a deteriorating external trade position and
rising growth between the 1980s and the 1990s are in Developing America. It is also
noteworthy that, between the 1980s and the 1990s, all the developing countries which
have been affected most by the recent financial crisis (i.e. Brazil, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand) experienced a worsening in their external trade position and
thus an increase in their external financing requirements.
A perhaps somewhat surprising feature is that Singapore is the only main exporter of
manufactures whose external trade position has improved between the 1980s and the
1990s, while that of Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand and
Turkey has worsened. It should not be forgotten, however, that exports with a
comparatively high income elasticity of demand encompasses a much broader spectrum
than manufactures. Some countries in the sample have been able to increase exports of
agro-industrial goods, such as for example Chile, where export earnings from fruit and
fishery and forestry products have, together, come to rival those from copper, and this
has helped her to achieve both increased growth and an improved external position
between the 1970s and the 1990s.
1.4 World growth and terms of trade
World growth, and in particular growth in developed countries, experienced a marked
and secular decline in the early-1970s. But while developed countries were still growing
at an annual average rate of about three per cent during the 1970s and 1980s, their rate
of growth slowed down to an average rate of below two per cent during the 1990s. One
consequence of this has been a decline in the demand for exports from developing
countries as many of the export items serve as inputs for production to the
manufacturing industries in developed countries. This decline in the demand for their
exports has been particularly harmful for developing countries over the past few years
during which many of them have adopted an export-led growth strategy. The
combination of an only slow growth in demand and the attempt by many developing
countries to capture the same export markets is likely to lead to a situation of falling
terms of trade for developing countries. Developing countries have indeed expanded
both the volume and value of their exports over the past few years but this has not
allowed them to experience a similar increase in the purchasing power of their exports.
Economies with a relatively specialized export structure are more vulnerable to adverse
terms of trade shocks so that the sustainable level of their current-account deficit tends
to be lower than that of economies with a more diversified export structure. As is well
known, many developing countries continue to be heavily dependent on a narrow range
of primary commodities for their export earnings. Despite temporary price hikes of
primary commodity prices – most recently in the mid-1990s – most developing8
countries have been subject to a downward trend in their terms of trade over the
medium- and long-term. There is a strong statistical evidence suggesting that the decline
in commodity prices since the early-1980s has been mostly of a secular and persistent
nature, and that an only small part is attributable to reversible cyclical forces. Moreover,
there is evidence that suggests that the volatility in commodity prices has risen steadily
and considerably since the early 1970s (Reinhart and Wickham 1994). There can be
little doubt that both these movements combined have had detrimental impacts on
economic growth and investment in developing countries.
The adverse impact of the recent financial crises in the Asian economies on the demand
for primary commodities has added further to the decline in the terms of trade of
commodity-exporting countries and the expectation is that commodity prices will
remain depressed well into the next century  even though commodity prices have
experienced a slight upturn during the first half of 1999 (World Bank 1998). It is clear
that under these circumstances commodity-exporting developing countries will find it
very difficult to obtain sufficient export earnings to finance the imports required to step
up growth. In particular, there is a danger that commodity-exporting countries will be
faced with a similar dilemma as in the 1980s when they tried to expand their exports in
an attempt to service mounting debt obligations with the result of contributing to a
further decline in commodity prices (see e.g. Gilbert 1989). This means that in spite of
an increase in the volume of commodity production and trade, many developing
countries did not succeed in raising their earnings from commodity exports.
6
An obvious policy conclusion from the above is that developing countries need to strive
for diversification with a view to raising the proportion of manufactures in their exports.
However, those developing countries for which manufactures have been the main
source of export earnings have not succeeded in obtaining a lasting improvement in
their terms of trade; the terms of trade of these countries have fallen on average by
somewhat over 1 per cent per annum since the beginning of the 1980s.
7
 But while a few
developing countries have come to export a wide variety of manufactures, many of them
have been in the early stages of manufacturing where labour-intensive or natural
resource-intensive goods can be produced with a well-established and relatively simple
technology. However, there is also a growing concern that such manufactured goods are
beginning to acquire the features of commodity exports. This notion of a
‘commoditization’ of some manufactured goods refers to the fact that there are few, or
no, barriers to enter the markets of such low-technology manufactures
8
 and output
expansions induce price falls. A possible explanation of this phenomenon regards the
entry of China into global markets as a major exporter of manufactured products after
1985. It has been argued, for example, that this has resulted in an approximately 20 per
                                                  
6 This is because a simultaneous expansion of export volumes by a number of producers results in lower
export prices and export revenues for each of them. The group of commodities for which this ‘adding-
up problem’ has been documented  include bananas, cocoa, coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. See
Akiyama and Larson (1994).
7 UNCTAD (1995, Table 2.5). The group of developing countries classified as major exporters of
manufactures include Brazil, Hong Kong (China), Malaysia, Mexico, the Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan (Province of China), Thailand, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia.
8 This definition follows Kaplinsky (1998).9
cent decline in the terms of trade of developing countries’ manufactured exports
between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s (Wood 1997).
1.5 Trade policies and its impact on economic growth
Regarding the evolution of the level of the real exchange rate, there is significant
difference between the three regions. The currencies of the Latin American countries
appreciated after trade liberalization as they had adopted a policy of  exchange-rate
based stabilization – as mentioned above, except Chile for which the data mirrors the
substantial devaluation in 1982. (Brazil had experienced a strong appreciation of its
currency in the late-1980s so that the depreciation shown in the data can be considered a
slight correction of that development.) The Asian countries maintained a by and large
unchanged level of their real exchange rate, except Turkey whose currency appreciated.
By contrast, the African countries (except Kenya, which faced strong appreciation, and
Tunisia, which maintained the pre-reform level of its real exchange rate) experienced
depreciation after trade liberalization. This phenomenon is marked most in Ghana and
Uganda but these two countries had suffered from very strong overvaluation in the pre-
reform period. This means that many liberalizing countries have not succeeded in
engineering a depreciation of the exchange rate in order to soften the need for
contractionary demand policies to contain the balance of payments problems after trade
liberalization. This appears to be true in particular for those countries where the
discrepancy between the growth rate of imports and that of exports is greatest during the
period immediately following trade liberalization (Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and
Turkey) all of which experienced a significant appreciation of their real exchange rate.
By contrast, countries, which maintained a relatively stable (and realistic) level of the
real exchange, i.e. Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Tunisia, experienced a relatively
balanced growth of their imports and exports in both periods. In addition to the level of
imports, their structure has an important bearing on growth and the potential for future
exports. A surge in imports of intermediate production inputs and capital goods,
particularly machinery and equipment, is likely to hold very different prospects in the
medium-term than one dominated by consumer goods. Empirical evidence (UNCTAD
1999) suggests that the share of capital goods in total imports increased after trade
liberalization in all four Asian developing, as well as in Argentina and Brazil, strongly
dropped in Kenya and Mexico, and remained unchanged in the other four countries. It is
also interesting to note that the share of luxury goods in total imports increased in
almost all of the fifteen countries, and very significantly so in Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Tunisia and Turkey. This suggests that the structure of trade liberalization in
these countries was less than optimal with regard to stimulating economic growth and
exports.
2 Theoretical base of current account and GDP growth relationship
Two gap models namely saving-investment and foreign exchange gaps were based on
the treatment of one gap more binding than the other and that provided a lower limit on
growth for available capital flow. The Chenery-Strout (1966) model provided an
absorptive capacity constraint stating that the peak capital inflow a developing country10
could absorb. Bacha (1984) was the first one to mention that the two gaps were identical
to the internal and external balances of the open economy macroeconomics with
developing country framework. Bacha (1990) introduced the third gap namely fiscal gap
in the two gap model and analysed the consequences of foreign resource transfers on the
GDP growth rate of developing countries. The utilisation of excess capacity was not
considered in the original two-gap models until Taylor (1991) brought the capacity
utilisation explicitly in the analysis of foreign capital requirements for developing
countries. In the three gap models, the constrained growth rate corresponding to each
gap can be derived and with respect to foreign exchange gap one can show how the
increased output cuts back on the growth rates and how decline in foreign transfer affect
the economies in short and medium run. A reduction in foreign transfer reduces output
levels in the short run while over the medium run net exports will rise until the savings
gap becomes binding. Basically, the model is static and does not go far enough to
analyse the complex process of dynamics of capital accumulation, trade balance and
economic growth. We, therefore, consider a dynamic framework under which a
constraint of current account balance can be derived under optimisation of consumption
over time.
We consider a small open economy inhabited by a representative agent with an infinite
time horizon. The economy starts in period t and continues forever. We normalize
population size to unity. The utility function for infinite period is






where Cs is consumption in period s and b is the discount rate. Deriving the t period-
budget constraint, the current account with constant interest rate is
CAt = Bt+1 –Bt = Yt + rBt –C t – G t - I t (2.2)
where CA is current account, B is net foreign assets accumulated on prior dates, I is
investment and is equivalent to changes in capital stock, C is consumption, G is
government expenditure, t refers to the time period.
There is an accounting equivalence of that net export surplus in current account is equal
to negative value in the capital account. However, current account balance shows the
accumulated trade balance over time while the net exports view yields a single period
excess of exports over imports. The current account balance is defined as the changes in
net foreign assets position between two periods i.e.
CAt = Bt+1 –Bt
If output is determined by Y= AF(K) i.e. output is a function of capital K (accumulated
over previous periods) with A as the given technology, the utility function after
substitution for consumption in period s will be11
[ ] s s 1 s s s 1 s s
t s
t s




One finds necessary conditions for maximizing U t with respect to B s+1 and K s+1. For
every period s‡t, two conditions must hold:
U’ (Cs) =(1+r) bU’ (Cs+1)  (2.4)
As+1 F’(Ks+1) = r (2.5)
These are called consumption (Euler) equation (2.4) and the equality between marginal
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Generally, there are inherent uncertainties that will affect consumption and investment
decisions, which will affect future income and payoffs on investment. In a stochastic
environment, we make the assumption of rational expectations and can replace the
utility maximization over time under certainty with the expected utility maximization
over infinite time period corresponding to equation 2.1. Rearranging the budget
constraint and writing TBs = Y s – C s – I s – G s as the economy’s trade balance in
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The trade balance is the net output the economy transfers to foreigners each period.
Suppose that Y s+1= (1+g) Y s where g>0 is the growth rate in output and that the
economy maintains a steady debt-output ratio (Bs/Ys) so that B s+1 = (1+g) B s. The



















To maintain constant debt-GDP ratio the country need to pay out excess of interest over
its growth rate. Alternatively, the necessary trade surplus as a proportion of GDP is
equivalent to the ratio of the debt to the world market value of a claim to the economy’s
entire future. The relationship between trade balance as a proportion to GDP and the
country’s growth rate is positive.
9
 The consumption function for infinite time period is a
simple equation. There are, however, possibilities of negative relationship between
economic growth and trade balances.
                                                  
9 The slow growing economies are likely to suffer the debt burden in the short-run. In 1991, the slow
growing Argentina and Nigeria had external debt as 3.9 per cent and 4.8 per cent of GDP respectively
while the fast growing Thailand had the same of the order of 0.2 per cent. (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1997)12
If output follows a stochastic process
Yt+1-Yt = j (Yt- Yt-1) (2.9)
with 0<j<1,









1 t t e Y Y j (2.10)
In the above equation permanent output fluctuates more than current output level.
Consumption smoothing implies that an unexpected increase in output causes an even
greater increase in consumption. However, a positive output innovation implies a
current account deficit.
The other case is the one where there is a trend productivity growth and a small
developing economy is growing faster than the world economy. In this case, debt-GDP
ratio is increasing forever which is unstable. This is because a country is promoting
higher growth now at the cost of future economic growth. Under our dynamic
framework, debt-GDP ratio could increase if there is a positive output shock or the
domestic growth rate
10
 is higher than the world economy’s growth rate. Productivity
shocks
11 can occur through terms of trade shocks and also through liberalization policy
in a developing economy. A temporary deterioration in terms of trade can cause a
current account deficit, whereas a permanent deterioration would cause an immediate
shift to the new lower consumption level consistent with external balance.
If we assume that the world real rate of interest is not constant but is equal to the growth
rate in developed economies then we have a model equation for trade balance to GDP
ratio where CA=Bs+1–Bs = rBs + TBs and the ratio of current account to GDP is
equivalent to TB/GDP+rB/GDP=F (GDP growth, Productivity shocks). As productivity
shocks are due to terms of trade changes, growth in developed world and liberalization
regimes, we use these as determinants of productivity shocks in trade balance to GDP
ratios.
TB/GDP = F (GDP growth, Terms of Trade, Growth in Industrial Countries,
Liberalization)  (2.11).
                                                  
10 It is now a well-known proposition that with integrated global capital markets there can be no
intercountry differences in returns to capital (risk-adjusted) and as capital flows to the country where
the rate of return is higher the cross-country differences in marginal products of capital would
disappear leading to convergence of output per worker. This proposition was empirically tested and a
plausible conclusion to draw from the debate is that there is convergence in output per worker but it
has been very slow.
11 In the representative agent model, the higher productivity growth will tend to weaken the current
account as people would borrow today against the higher future income. In the overlapping
generations model, the prodcutivity growth could raise the labour income of young workers but does
not affect the wage incomes of the older workers. As young savers will count more heavily in
aggregate saving than old dissavers, saving will tend to rise and the current account to improve.
(Obstfeld 1995).13
For current account to GDP percentages, we use world interest rate that is determined
by the growth rate in developed countries. So, our estimating equation for CA/GDP is:
CA/GDP=F (World Interest Rate, Terms of Trade, Liberalization)  (2.12)
and World Interest rate is determined by the growth rate in developed economies.
In the above relationships, we expect interactions between liberalization and GDP
growth and liberalization and terms of trade as liberalization is likely to affect both the
terms of trade and economic growth. The marginal effect of GDP growth on TB/GDP
will be negative as developing countries are likely to grow faster than developed
countries and their import propensity will be higher than export propensity in the short-
run. Moreover, the marginal impact of terms of trade will be positive as improvement of
terms of trade in favour of developing economies will lead to improvement in TB/GDP
ratio. The higher growth in developed economies will improve trade balance to GDP
ratio as the developing countries are likely to export more to developed world since
growth in industrialized world creates demand for commodities and raw-materials
including intermediate products.
3 Trade balance to GDP ratios and its determinants for 14 countries
3.1 Adverse effects from trade liberalization and an inappropriate level of the real
exchange rate
Since the mid-1980s, a large number of developing countries liberalized their trade
regimes. Trade liberalization has usually been part of more comprehensive economic
reforms designed to accelerate economic growth. This turn to economic liberalization
was the result of a number of factors: it was a response to the economic crisis, which
many developing countries had been facing in the years before, including that related to
the debt crisis; in particular in Latin America there was a feeling that import
substitution, which was initially adopted as a policy response to specific conditions
prevailing in the international economy, had been continued far too long; last but not
least, many developing countries were faced with pressure from multilateral financial
institutions to liberalize their economies.
The economic rationale for trade policy reform has been debated extensively. It is
commonly based on the view that the move towards a liberal trade regime leads to more
efficient resource use, better access to state-of-the-art technologies and greater
productive efficiency through the exposure of the domestic economy to world market
discipline. The move towards a more efficient mix of investment, production and trade
is expected to enhance a country’s medium-term growth prospects. There is a large
body of empirical literature that generally shows that countries with more open trade
policies, as well as those with a faster speed of integration into the world economy,
grow faster than countries that are more inward oriented even though it is not always
clear to what extent the results of these studies are sensitive to the debatable14
classification of East Asian economies as ‘open’.
12
 It has also been widely recognized
that trade liberalization does not come without costs. This view has been based mostly
on microeconomic considerations arguing that the private economic and social costs of
trade liberalization can be large for some groups and individuals (e.g. workers in
import-competing industries) but that these costs are only temporary and that on
aggregate benefits more than outweigh costs.
Balance of payment constraints can have a decisive influence on the design of trade
reform, as well as on the sustainability of reform and the pace of economic growth. This
is particularly so if trade reform is not backed up by appropriate exchange rate policies
and trade-restrictions remain an integral element of the balance of payments position
required to preserve macroeconomic stability and rapid growth. Before the widespread
adoption of more liberal trade policies over the past two decades or so, developing
countries routinely tightened their trade regimes when they were experiencing balance
of payments problems.
13
 Such concerns and experiences were also reflected in GATT-
rules allowing member countries to have recourse to temporary restrictions on trade in
goods and services for balance of payments purposes (GATT Article XVIII).
Given that imports usually react much faster than exports to trade liberalization, trade
policy reforms lead to balance of payments problems and lower rates of economic
growth if the government uses contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in order to
dampen the import boom without resorting to exchange-rate devaluation. The adoption
of contractionary macroeconomic policies is designed to reduce imports by reducing the
level of economic activity. However, domestic capital formation in the tradeable sector
is likely to be adversely affected by these restrictive demand policies with the result that
the supply response in that sector is both delayed and smaller. In industrialized
countries, devaluing the exchange rate concomitantly with the adoption of trade
liberalization reduces the extent of required contractionary macroeconomic policies as it
helps to reduce the import bill and to raise export earnings, thereby containing the
deterioration in the trade account (see e.g. Dornbusch 1990). In commodity-producing
countries, devaluations have usually a less favourable impact on the country’s export
earnings as a higher volume of exports cause a fall in prices.
Little attempt has been made to assess the size of devaluations needed to accompany a
move to trade liberalization. This reflects, partly, the theoretical and empirical
difficulties in determining the appropriate real exchange rate, and partly, the difficult
political economy issues raised by devaluation (see Dornbusch 1990). Moreover, trade
liberalization cannot be accompanied by a devaluation if inflation is out of control and
the nominal exchange rate, in combination with other nominal variables such as wages,
are used as nominal anchor during disinflation. The latter has been a prominent feature
of the turbulent adjustment processes in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the 1990s and
                                                  
12 See Trade and Development Report (UNCTAD 1997) for discussion. For a critical assessment of the
empirical evidence, see also Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999).
13 For discussion, see for example Little et al. (1993).15
in Chile in the late 1970s (but this strategy was reversed in Chile with the 1982-
devaluation).
14
Whereas until the 1980s developing countries tended to liberalize their trade policy
regimes only in periods of trade account surpluses, they have increasingly come to
adopt and maintain trade liberalization in spite of existing trade deficits. This change in
trade policy has occurred mainly in Latin America and Africa, while Asian countries
have followed a more selective and gradual approach to trade liberalization. There was a
significant opening to foreign direct investment (FDI) in South-East Asian countries in
the mid-1980s. This opening has partly been designed to raise the supply of new
technology for industrialization, i.e. an objective that is closely related to the main
economic rationale for trade policy reform, as mentioned above. Hence, changes in
openness towards FDI can serve as a measure for changes in integration in these
countries.
An attempt can be made to date the change in policy from when on trade policy has not
been tightened. This has been done for 15 countries.
15
 Five countries from Latin
America – Argentina (1991), Brazil (1991), Chile (1976), Colombia (1991) and Mexico
(1986); five countries from Asia – Korea (1986), Malaysia (1988), Philippines (1986),
Thailand (1986) and Turkey (1989); and five countries from Africa – Ghana (1985),
Kenya (1993), Morocco (1984), Tunisia (1989) and Uganda (1988). However, to isolate
the impact of this regime change on the liberalizing country’s trade account is made
difficult by the fact that trade liberalization has in some cases been preceded or
accompanied by exchange rate devaluation or a move towards a more flexible exchange
rate regime. Therefore, an evaluation of the changes in imports and exports following
trade liberalization also needs to take exchange rate changes into account. Turkey was
excluded because no data on income terms of trade were available.
3.2 Trade liberalization and growth in exports and imports
It is convenient to distinguish the immediate impact of trade liberalization on the growth
rate of imports and exports from its more medium-term impact because exports usually
pick up only after a time lag. Regarding the period immediately following trade
liberalization, imports grew faster than exports in all ten countries from Latin America
as well as for Kenya; the other four African countries show a more balanced
development (Table 4). In a medium-term period after trade liberalization, by contrast,
exports and imports grew at about the same speed, except Brazil were imports grew
very significantly stronger than exports, and Argentina where exports grew much faster
than imports. However, Argentina’s imports had grown at a rate of over 60 per cent
during the period immediately following liberalization, compared to a two-per cent
growth of exports, so that it is not surprising that the rate of import growth slowed
down. Looking at the two periods combined, the exports of most of the liberalizing
countries have not grown fast enough after trade liberalization to compensate for the
rapid growth of imports during the years immediately following trade liberalization.
                                                  
14 For the adjustment experience of these countries, see, for example, Amadeo (1996). For a recent
general discussion of this issue, see Calvo and Vegh (1999).
15 The classification is based on data from three studies: Little et al. (1993), Rajapatirana et al. (1996),
and Sachs and Warner (1995). See also Dean et al. (1994).16
This evidence suggests that trade liberalization in developing countries has tended to
lead to a deterioration in the trade account.
We now present the results of panel data estimation designed to obtain the relation
between economic growth and trade balance in developing countries and the effect of
liberalization on this relation. These results can also be used in constructing scenarios to
estimate payments deficits that could be associated with faster growth in developing
countries than has so far been achieved, and hence of their external financing
requirements. The model is specified by taking the ratio of trade balance to income
(TBGDPIMF and TBGDP from UNCTAD) as the dependent variable, and the growth
rate (GROWTH) and the purchasing power of exports (i.e. income terms of trade) (PPI)
of developing countries, and the growth rate of developed countries (DEVWD) as
explanatory variables. Income rather than barter terms of trade is used to capture the
effects of both relative prices and export volumes and to assess the impact of
liberalization on import propensity.
16
 Liberalization (LIB) is used as a dummy variable
and is expected to capture the joint effects of exchange rate appreciation and instability
resulting from capital account liberalization as well as the impact of import
liberalization. The regression equations are estimated on the basis of panel data
estimation techniques using the information for 14 countries over 30 years, i.e. from
1970 to 1999. The equations are estimated alternatively as random effects and fixed
effects models. The Hausman test supports the random effects model implying that the
intercepts are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
17
 In general, cross-section
and time series data on their own yield very different estimates of a model. If pooled
cross-section and time-series data are available, we have more information and this in
turn avoids a number of problems encountered with either cross-section or time-series
alone. One method of reducing omitted-variable bias is to use a panel instead of the
standard cross-country data. Panel estimation controls for differences in time-invariant,
unobservable country characteristics, thereby removing any bias resulting from the
correlation of these characteristics with the explanatory variables. As a first hypothesis,
LIBERAL is used as an intercept shift; i.e. it adds to trade deficits by a constant amount
independent of the values of the explanatory variables.
We show the results of various estimation procedures in Tables 5A, 5B and 5C. In
Table 5A, we show the result of fixed effects versus random effects models. Three
dependent variables are used alternately. In each case, the Hausman test favours the
random effects model. Analysing the results of random effects model, we find that the
increase in growth by 1 per cent will contribute to 0.19 percentage point to the trade
deficit while a similar improvement in growth will contribute to current account deficit
                                                  
16 Since the TB/GDP percentage incorporates the barter terms of trade and the export volume, in this
formulation the impact of income terms of trade on the trade balance works through import volumes.
The model has also been estimated using the net barter terms of trade. The latter had a positive and
significant impact on the trade balance, and the effect of other explanatory variables were broadly
similar to those obtained with the income terms of trade. However, unlike the specification reported
here, liberalization had no effect on the relation between barter terms of trade and trade balances.
17 These models using panel data analysis differ according to whether they treat intercept parameters as
random or fixed across the sample. The estimators in the random effects model are the generalized
least squares estimators, and they combine the within and between country estimators using the
corresponding residual variances as weights.  For elementary panel data techniques see Johnston
(1996). For special treatment of panel data models, see Wooldridge (2002).17
by 0.15 percentage point ceteris paribus. The faster growth in developed economies
tends to reduce the deficit and 1 extra percentage point growth in developed world will
improve the trade balance to GDP by 0.79 percentage point and current account by 0.51
percentage point. An increase in oil prices tends to have a negative effect on both
current account and trade balance as oil-producing economies are not in our sample.
Liberalization significantly improves current account but on its own liberalization does
not have a significant effect on trade balance. The improvement in terms of trade on its
own improves both trade balance and current account but when liberalization impact is
considered along with the improvement in terms of trade, the impact of improvement in
terms of trade on trade balance is considerably reduced.
In Table 5B, we deal with the problem of endogenity of growth variable. Growth might
depend upon investment to GDP ratio and initial level GDP at constant prices in each
country. We therefore adopt instrumental variable approach to the estimation of random
effects models. Our test does not reject the hypothesis of zero correlation between
country effects and the error term. For each of the three dependent variables we estimate
random effects models with IV procedure (Baltagi 1995). Our results marginally worsen
with respect to the Growth variable when it is treated endogenous and two-stage
estimator is derived. Most of the other coefficients have the same signs as in Table 5A
and income terms of trade have a positive impact in improving trade balance to GDP or
current account to GDP percentages. The model is static and does not have lagged
variables. This is now corrected in Table 5C.
We estimate two further models, one a dynamic model and the other, the first
differenced model by using the Instrumental Variable technique. We write the equation
for a dynamic model in the following form:
it t i it it it it y y y e h a d d + + + + + = - - B X 2 2 1 1   i = 1, 2…….14, t = 1,2,…….30  (4.1)
yit is the trade balance or current account to GDP in percentages,  Xit is a set of
explanatory variables namely liberaliazation, growth in real GDP, purchasing power of
exports (terms of trade), and intereactions of purchasing power of exports with
liberalization and Growth rate in real GDP in developed economies. ht is the effects of
time or year dummies and may be represented as cyclical impacts on trade balance to
GDP percentages. We expect the sign of the coefficients to be positive with respect to
purchasing power of exports and growth in developed economies while we expect
negative sign with respect to growth in real GDP and oil prices.
Even if yit-1 and eit are not correlated, if t does not approach infinity (t=30 in our case)
then estimation by fixed effects or random effects is not consistent even if n (number of
countries) goes to infinity. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest an alternative procedure
that corrects not only for the bias introduced by the lagged endogenous variable, but
also permits a degree of endogeneity in the other regressors such as Growth variable on
the right hand side variable as a subset of  X matrix. The Generalized Method of
Moments Estimator first differences each variable and then use lagged values of each of
the variables as instruments. Specifically,
it it it it it y y y e d d D + + D + D = D - - B ?X 2 2 1 1 (4.2)18
The first three observations are lost due to lags and differencing. Assuming that eit are
not autocorrelated for each i at t=4, yi1 and yi2 are valid instruments for lagged variables.
Similarly, at t=5, yi1, yi2 and yi3 are valid instruments. We thus estimate the dynamic
model using the above procedure.
18
 For the first differenced model, we explicitly use
the instruments for the Growth variable namely investment to GDP ratio, GDP at
constant prices of the last period and the growth variable lagged by three periods. We
discuss these results using the 14-country sample with 30 observations for each country.
In the first differenced model, the second lag is not used. All the variables are in first
differenced form. The second lagged variable is not significant. Of the two results for
each dependent variable we prefer the first version as it captures endogeneity of some so
called exogenous regressors. For the dynamic model, the signs of the estimated
coefficients are in agreement with our  a priori views. Growth has a negative and
significant coefficient and its impact is slightly less on current account to GDP
percentages than on trade balance to GDP percentage. The growth in developed world
in current period acts as a cushion for averting the current account deficit while
liberalization helps to improve current account but liberlisation with income terms of
trade tends to worsen the current account and trade balance to GDP percentages. When
we control for relevant factors, we find that the impact of 1 per cent increase in growth
rate in developing countries tends to worsen the trade balance to GDP percentage by
0.22 points while the current account deteriorates by 0.20 points. When this effect is
combined with last period growth the impact on both trade balance and current account
is much larger and it is nearly 0.40 points.
4 Trade balance and growth relationships, structural change and endogenity
with a larger sample of 64 countries
Our study of 14 countries have shown that as expected, growth in a liberalized
developing economy is associated with greater trade deficits than in a non-liberalized
economy. On the other hand, increases in the purchasing power of exports continue to
improve the trade balance in a liberalized economy, but less than before liberalization.
This suggests that liberalization tends to raise the import propensity, and is indeed
consistent with the rise in the share of imports in GDP in developing countries as a
whole from 21.5 per cent in 1990 to over 27 per cent in 1996.
By contrast, the results show that faster growth in industrial countries improves the
trade balance in a liberalized developing economy more than in a non-liberalized
economy. A possible explanation for this result is that in an open economy emphasizing
trade, business is generally more prepared to exploit market opportunities abroad than in
an inward-oriented economy.
19
 In other words, this result could be due to a positive
impact of liberalization on export growth associated with any given growth rate of
industrial countries. Accordingly, if industrial countries grow sufficiently rapidly,
                                                  
18 Monte Carlo simulation has shown that for panels with t=5 or 6, the bias of the coefficients of lagged
dependent variable can be significant, although the bias for the coefficients on other right hand side
variables tends to be minor.
19 This could also be true in an  economy which is not very open but export-oriented, such as the
contemporary China (not included in the sample) or the East Asian newly industrialized economies
until the past decade.19
acceleration of exports in developing countries could lead to an improvement in their
trade balance even though this may bring in more imports than in a non-liberalized
economy.
These results are presented in Tables 6 to 11. In Table 6, we present fixed effects and
random effects results based on 1620 observations with three dependent variables used
alternately. The significant coefficients nearly have the same magnitude in all
regressions and the coefficient of liberalization and its interaction with terms of trade
are not significant for the current account to GDP regression equation. For trade balance
to GDP percentages, increases in the purchasing power of exports continue to improve
the trade balance in a liberalized economy, but less than before liberalization. In the
model with UNCTAD trade data, the coefficient of liberalization is positive while it is
negative with respect to LIBPPI. An increase in oil prices unambiguously tends to
deteriorate the trade balance and current account while the growth in the developed
world tends to improve the trade balance and current account in all models. For current
account model, the random effects model is not rejected while for trade balance to GDP
percentage regressions, the random effects model is rejected. This means that there
exists a significant correlation between the fixed effect and exogenous regressors.
In Tables 7 and 8 the results of dynamic models are presented. Both first differenced
models and dynamic models are estimated by instrumental variable estimation
technique. First differences remove the fixed effects and given the dynamics, we
introduce lagged effects on changes in TBGDPIMF and CAGDP and TBGDP. We
sometimes find that both growth and lagged growth effects are negative on trade
balance. This also confirms that the faster growth in a developing economy tends to
reduce the trade and current account balance. On the other hand, the larger growth
achieved in developed countries tends to assist the trade balance and current accounts.
The terms of trade have significant positive effects without liberalization in improving
trade balance and current account but liberalization with terms of trade tends to
deteriorate the trade balance or current account. A rise in oil prices tends to reduce trade
surplus. The results of Table 8 confirm most of the tentative conclusions of Table 7.
With a more general dynamic model, the Generalized Method of Moments estimator is
provided and this also supports that there is no serial correlation in the error term.
However, like many other studies, the Sargan test rejects the overidentifying
restrictions. Liberalization does not have a significant impact on the TBGDPIMF,
CAGDP or TBGDP. It is terms of trade in conjunction with the liberalization, which
tends to deteriorate the trade balance or current account to GDP percentages.
In Table 9, we have introduced real exchange rates variable. This information is not
complete and like previous tables, we have unbalanced panel but with reduced number
of observations. For all three dependent variables we have 1224 observations. Tables 9,
10 and 11 provide these results with static and dynamic models. If lags are not used, we
have contradictions on the choice of fixed effects versus random effects models. For the
Current account to GDP percentages and UNCTAD based TBGDP variables, the null
hypothesis of random effects is rejected. For TBGDPIMF, the hypothesis of random
effects is accepted. In Table 10, models based on first differences are presented.
Instruments are used and IV estimation is carried out. These results probably suffer
from serial correlation of higher order as higher order lagged dependent variable is20
significant. When the dynamic model is estimated with GMM procedure, we find that
there is no second order serial correlation in error term and lagged dependent variables
have significant coefficients in all models when all variables used are in first
differenced form. These results point out the importance of real exchange rate. A
depreciation of real exchange rate improves trade balance and current account. Growth,
PPI, Libppi and Oilpr all have correctly signed coefficients. Lib and Libppi loses its
significance when real exchange rate is introduced in the model.
5 Estimation of model by regions
A possible shortcoming of the above specifications is the treatment of 64 countries as
one sample and this may have serious limitation as different countries belong to
different regions and there are sometimes trade blocks within regions. We decided to
treat Africa, Asia and Latin American countries separately. For the African, Asian and
Latin American block we have respectively 30, 14 and 20 countries in the original
sample. If we exclude the countries for which the information on income terms of trade
(PPI) is not available we have respectively 25, 11 and 18 countries in our sample. As we
divide into blocs, we have more observations over time compared to countries. We use
time demeaned observations
20
 and then pool the sample for each bloc and treat growth
as an endogenous variable for which a separate equation is estimated. We propose a
model where
t it it it it it
t it it it o it
LIBERAL OILPR DEVWD GDPLAG GROWTH
DEVWD PPI GROWTH TBGDPIMF
2 4 3 2 1 0
1 3 2 1
e d d d d d
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+ + + + + =
+ + + + =
  (5.1)
The model is not strictly simultaneous as TBGDPIMF does not influence the GROWTH
variable directly. The results of this system are presented in Table 12. For African
economies, the relationship between trade balance and GDP growth is negative but not
significant while for Asian and Latin American countries the increase in growth rate
deteriorates the trade balance to GDP percentages significantly. An improvement in
terms of trade improves the trade balance for all three groups. The growth in developed
world has positive and significant impact on trade balance to GDP percentages in
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The results on growth equation for three blocs differ to some extent. The growth
convergence accounted for by the last year’s GDP variable does not turn out to be
significant although it has a negative coefficient at 10 per cent significant level for
Asian economies. However, the sign is negative and there is some evidence of
convergence among these economies. The growth in developed world improves the
growth in Asian and Latin American economies significantly but it has no significant
impact in African economies. An increase in oil prices is harmful to growth in both
African and Latin American economies. Liberalization has a positive and significant
                                                  
20 We subtract the mean of each country (mean calculated with 30 observations over time) from the
original observed values and then pool this data for Africa (25 countries), Asia (11 countries) and
Latin America (18 countries). As we use the lagged GDP, we lose 25, 11 and 18 observations in each
group.21
impact on growth in Asia and Latin America while this does not play any significant
role in African economies. It seems that structurally, African economies are different
from Asian and Latin American economies and the treatment of each bloc might reveal
some of the underlying weaknesses of pooling the data of all developing economies
together.
A similar model was estimated by using the current account to GDP percentages as a
dependent variable in Table 13. The results are quite different between the two as the
current account in African, Asian and Latin American economies tend to respond
positively to the growth in their economies while trade balance tends to deteriorate with
higher growth rate in domestic economy. An improvement in terms of trade improves
the current account balances for Asian and Latin Anerican economies. In Asia, the
growth rate in developed countries tends to improve the growth in the domestic
economy. Oil price rise deteriorates growth in Africa and Latin America while we get
opposite effect in Asian economies.
A major conclusion from this model is that both trade balance to GDP and current
account to GDP could have different impacts of domestic growth under liberalization.
When different models were considered for prediction purposes with low, medium and
high values of explanatory variables, we found that the predicted trade balance to GDP
deficits did not vary a great deal among them. The sensitivity of trade deficits to GDP
percentages is generally low with respect to growth rates in most estimated models. If
the world market conditions are favourable such as growth in developed countries and
favourable terms of trade for developing economies, then the situation of higher trade
deficits with low growth rates are less likely to arise and a suitable trade policy leading
to appropriate real exchange rates should be able to mitigate the effects of shocks in the
short-run. It also might be the case that the relationship between trade deficits and
economic growth might be non-linear and a very high economic growth could result
into improvement in trade balance (for example China). In the medium run, the growth
in developing economies would perhaps tend to improve trade balance if the developed
world provided a faster access to their markets.
6 Summary and conclusions
This long paper has posed variety of problems and one of the most important issue is the
capital financing requirements of developing economies in the short to medium run.
Globalization has made both developing and developed countries interdependent. In
such environment of highly integrated markets for goods, capital and ideas one would
expect to observe absolute convergence meaning thereby the same level of output per
worker, regardless of country’s saving rates or population growth. If one considers a
large number of developing and developed countries in the same sample, Baumol et al.
(1989) argue that if one looks separately at low income, medium-income and high-
income countries, there is evidence of convergence within each group. But his finding
does not explain why one does not observe convergence across groups. Within a group,
where the countries show the absolute convergence, the process appears to be slow.
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991) estimate the time period to be 35 years to close half of
per capita income within the same group of OECD countries. If the developing22
countries were to achieve half of the per capita income of the developed economies in a
reasonable time period,
21 enormous help would be needed from developed countries by
way of capital financing. Despite the liberalization in trade and finance, private capital
is less likely to move in required amounts to developing countries to promote higher
economic growth so that they can catch up with the developed countries’ per capita
income and reduce the disparity in per capita incomes. Trade liberalization has
increased the imports of developing countries by and large and although after the initial
phase of import growth exports picked up in some developing countries, on the whole it
remained insufficient to narrow the trade deficits. Rapid liberalization was sometimes
followed by large inflows of capital, currency appreciation and mounting trade deficits
but it often ended with a crisis involving reversal of capital inflows, collapse and
overshooting of exchange rates, sharp cuts in imports and a deep economic contraction.
If developed economies of the world would like to see the prospects of faster growth for
developing countries, trade and financial liberalization would not be entirely appropriate
without establishing institutions to facilitate a change in developing economies.
Moreover, until the structure of the economy becomes favourable for growth, trade and
financial liberalization alone will produce short-term reversal in growth rates and
divergence in per capita income. The hypothesis that greater integration promotes
economic growth is a plausible proposition but there are examples where opening the
economy to trade lowers the rate of growth. (Grossman and Helpman 1990, 1991).
Our study has many limitations as the data inadequacies dominate the model estimation.
Real exchange rates were not available for all 64 countries although the limited data
revealed significant impact of depreciation of real exchange rates in improving trade
balance to GDP percentages. The measures of trade liberalization namely Sachs-Warner
index or our constructed dummies do not take into account different intensities of
liberalization attempts in different time periods. Most often liberalization in almost all
measures amount to reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers by the country concerned.
It is not evident that the developed countries have necessarily followed the relaxation of
tariff and non-tariff barriers to the same extent as developing countries. This effect was
not considered in our study.
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Table 1
Trade account to GDP ratio and GDP growth: 1989–96 compared with 1970–79
(excluding 1974–75)
Improving trade account Deteriorating trade account






3 to 5% PNG Cyprus Guyana Ghana
Kuwait
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14 big countries in bold (defined as largest GDP in 1990-95 and GDP greater than US $60 billion in 1997 excluding the major oil-exporting countries, as well as Hong Kong, Singapore).
12 major oil exporting countries in italics. 9 main manufactures underlined.
All data from ETS except data on current GDP are from World Development Indicators for Ghana, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Zimbabwe. As no data on current GDP are available for 1996 for Barbados, Bolivia, Gambia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, the second
period comprises only 1989-95 for these countries.26
Table 2
Trade account to GDP ratio and GDP growth: 1989–96 compared with 1982–88
Improving trade account Deteriorating trade account
More than 10% 5 to 10% 2 to 5% 0 to 2% 0 to 2% 2 to 5% 5 to 10% More than 10%
More than
5% growth









































































18 big countries in bold (defined as largest GDP in 1990-95 and GDP greater than US $60 billion in 1997 excluding the major oil-exporting countries, as well as Hong Kong, Singapore).
9 major oil exporting countries in italics.  9 main exporters of manufactures underlined.
All data from ETS except data on current GDP are from World Development Indicators for Ghana, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Zimbabwe. As no data on current GDP are available for 1996 for Barbados, Bolivia, Gambia, Iran, Iraq, Liberai, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, the second
period comprises only 1989–95 for these countries.27
Table 3A
Average annual growth rates of import and export values,
Selected developing country groups, 1970–96, percentages
1970–79 less 1974–75 1982–88 1989–96
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Developing countries and territories 22.0 18.6 2.0 2.6 11.7 12.4
Non-fuel developing countries 21.6 17.9 9.0 5.5 12.1 13.4
Non-fuel developing countries excl.
China
21.4 17.5 8.8 4.8 11.7 13.5
Non-fuel sub-Saharan Africa 14.0 13.4 3.2 1.0 6.2 6.1
Non-fuel Developing America 18.8 15.0 2.9 -1.9 9.7 13.9
Non-fuel Developing Asia and
Oceania
26.5 21.8 12.9 9.6 13.2 13.9
China 25.7 28.2 12.3 16.4 15.9 12.8
Source: UNCTAD database.
Table 3B
Average annual growth rates of import and export volumes
Selected developing country groups, 1970–96, percentages
1970–79 less 1974–75 1982–88 1989–96
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Developing countries and territories 6.9 5.9 4.7 1.2 8.2 9.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.4 7.0 0.8 -6.8 3.6 2.4
Developing America 6.3 3.0 2.8 -4.5 6.7 9.1
South and South-East Asia 15.2 8.5 11.7 9.0 11.4 11.6
Non-fuel developing countries 10.6 4.9 8.6 3.9 11.6 10.0
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, various years.28
Table 4
Growth of imports and exports and movements of real exchange rates after trade








First two years after regime change in
trade policy
Growth
b  of                    Real exch.





b  of                  Real exch.
Exports       Imports     rate
c
Latin America
Argentina 1991   2 65    87 22 13 76
Brazil 1990   2   5  110   8  33 104
Chile 1976 17 31    98   9    4 119
Colombia 1991   2 24    93
d 14 12   75
Mexico 1986   6 18    93 15 16  64
Asia
Malaysia 1988   18 32    103
d 18 18 104
d
Philippines 1986   15 18    107
d  15 19  98
d
Thailand 1986   31 32      98  17 19  86
Turkey 1989     5 15      85  11 18  82
Africa
Ghana 1985  22 18    141
d  12  21 247
d
Kenya 1993  12  21     82   n.a. n.a. n.a
Morocco 1984    7    2    157
d   7  9 119
d
Tunisia 1989  16 13    103
d  9  9 100
d
Uganda 1988 -21 -25    136
d  35 39 242
a Subsequent (under10) years until 1996, where the regime change was after 1986.
b Annual average growth of value in per cent.
c Index of average real exchange rate with the dollar unless otherwise indicated
(year of regime change =100), and increase in the index indicates depreciation.
d Real effective exchange rate
Source: UNCTAD database, except real effective exchange rates which are from International Financial
Statistics.29
Table 5A
14 countries study: Fixed effects model (LEVELS)
Dependent variable

























































































































su 4.6672 5.0264 0.9528 0.6680 5.1617 5.8883
se 3.9283 3.9283 3.8840 3.8840 4.1691 4.1691
r 0.5853 0.6208 0.0567 0.0287 0.6052 0.6661
R
2 0.2447 0.1611 0.1999 0.2011 0.2314 0.1236




420 420 420 420 364 364
Wald c






14 countries study: Random effects model estimated by error component two stage least squares
(LEVELS)
Dependent variable






















































su 4.1154 0.0 5.6418
se 8.3764 7.7642 8.1394
r 0.1945 0.0 0.3245
R
2 0.0804 0.1743 0.0767
No. observations 336 336 336
Wald c
2(6) 70.16 69.84 57.49
Instrumented: Growth instruments used: devwd, oilpr, liberal, libppi, growth(-2) inv and gdpconstant31
Table 5C
14 countries study: Dynamic model estimated by Arellano Bond
Panel data estimation and first differenced regression by instrumental variable estimation


















































































































































































378 364 378 364 322 308
Wald c





R-square 0.2340 0.3758 0.0358
su 4.5319 1.1238 5.5742
se 3.2846 3.4883 3.9661
r 0.6556 0.0940 0.6639
Instrumented: Lagged  Dependent variable, all varaibles in first differences.
Instruments used: growth, lagged growth, devwd, lagged devwd, oilpr, ppi, liberal, libppi, and lag3 of dependent
variable
Note: z-statistic is normally distributed. In the dynamic model, results of robust standard errors are used.32
Table 6
Panel data estimation, fixed effects and random effects models without dynamics (LEVELS)
Dependent variable

































































































su 9.032 8.4960 5.0915 4.9713 9.5704 8.8925
se 6.488 6.4887 7.4677 7.4677 5.9745 5.9745
r 0.6596 0.6316 0.3173 0.3071 0.7196 0.6900
R
2 0.1089 0.0527 0.0580 0.0446 0.2066 0.0589




1620 1620 1620 1620 1404 1404
Wald c
2(6) 191.22 96.87 346.96
Hausman c
2(6) 39.33 2.49 27.13
Figures in parentheses are z-statistics, Z is normally distributed.33
Table 7
First difference panel data models: Instrumental variable estimation with endogenous growth
Dependent variable










Lagged Variable -0.1841 -1.88 -0.2317 -2.16 -0.3543 -1.36
GROWTH -0.0313 -1.24 -0.0455 -1.69 -0.1003 -4.30
Lag Growth -0.0562 -2.27 -0.0786 -3.03 -0.1136 -4.54
DEVWD 0.3019 3.19 0.3588 3.61 0.2657 3.14
Lag DEVWD 0.2498 2.46 0.3356 3.14 0.2983 2.27
OILPR -0.0897 -2.93 -0.0484 -1.52 -0.0756 -2.53
PPI 0.0535 7.40 0.0453 6.01 0.0780 10.83
LIBERAL 2.8264 1.96 2.3874 1.59 0.9025 0.59
LIBPPI -0.0341 -3.87 -0.0253 -2.75 -0.0227 -2.20
CONSTANT -0.1288 -0.79 -0.0341 -0.20 -0.3596 -2.20
su 10.74 6.0370 13.5168
se 5.89 6.1327 5.1715
r 0.7691 0.4921 0.8723
Wald c
2(10) 102.77 87.55 177.88
No. observations 1404 1404 1188
Note:  Instrumented lagged dependent variable, all varaibles are in first differences.
Instruments used: growth, lagged growth, devwd, lagged devwd, oilpr, ppi, liberal, libppi and third lag of the
 dependent variable.
Table 8
Two-step estimation of a Dynamic Model with lags and instruments: Areallano-Bond estimation
Dependent variable












TBGDPIMF(-1) 0.5074 35.05 0.5267 23.38 0.4799 17.45
TBGDPIMF(-2) -0.0809 -4.33 -0.0202 -0.71 0.0168 0.73
GROWTH -0.0397 -1.56 -0.0613 -5.16 -0.1103 -8.14
GROWTH(-1) -0.1263 -5.27 0.0308 2.12 -0.1009 -8.42
GROWTH(-2) -0.0800 -2.00 -0.0320 -2.27 -0.0345 -2.03
DEVWD 0.2673 5.11 0.4124 9.99 0.4124 13.28
DEVWD(-1) -0.1197 -3.20 -0.1328 -3.47 -0.0029 -0.10
OILPR -0.0808 -9.75 -0.0560 -4.06 -0.0460 -5.29
PPI 0.0342 5.34 0.0283 3.04 0.0586 18.32
LIBERAL -1.8183 -0.81 1.8121 0.65 2.1461 0.80
LIBPPI -0.0165 -1.75 -0.0177 -1.44 -0.0373 -2.32





AC test order 1 -3.45 -3.65 -4.23
AC test order 2 -0.98 -1.21 -0.96
Wald c
2(11) 10823.38 3229.73 5642.77
No. Observations 1458 1454 1242
All variables are in first diffferences. Growth lagged by period 2–5 are used as instruments.34
Table 9
Panel data estimation, fixed effects and random effects models without dynamics with real exchange
rates (LEVELS model)
Dependent variable















































































































su 9.3005 9.0209 5.3840 4.7121 9.4245 8.9245
se 6.1425 6.1425 7.6317 7.6317 5.8148 5.8148
r 0.6963 0.6832 0.3323 0.2760 0.7243 0.7020
R
2 0.1480 0.0367 0.0654 0.0342 0.2296 0.0669
F(50,1166) 55.87 11.27 62.29
No. of
observations
1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224
Wald c
2(7) 201.14 77.51 346.08
Hauman c
2(7) 11.51 257.33 14.42
Figures in parentheses are z-statistics, Z is normally distributed.35
Table 10
First difference panel data models: Instumental variable estimation with endogenous growth
Dependent variable










Lagged Varaible -0.1606 -1.48 -0.2590 -2.10 -0.1932 -0.61
GROWTH -0.1061 -3.50 -0.0448 1.36 -0.0833 -3.35
Lag Growth -0.0835 -2.72 -0.0674 -2.08 -0.1089 -4.35
DEVWD 0.2884 2.67 0.3251 2.84 0.1921 2.16
Lag DEVWD 0.2122 1.80 0.2946 2.37 0.2311 1.67
OILPR -0.1265 -3.48 -0.0639 -1.66 -0.0859 -2.84
PPI 0.0755 7.54 0.0741 7.04 0.0863 9.83
LIBERAL 1.2542 0.68 0.5606 0.28 1.4290 0.85
LIBPPI -0.0217 -1.72 -0.0121 -0.90 -0.0261 -2.28
REER 2.4838 4.37 2.6695 4.36 -0.2153 -0.41
CONSTANT -0.1919 -0.86 -0.1130 -0.55 -0.4068 -2.39
su 10.9249 6.8201 12.04986
se 6.0193 6.4038 4.8569
r 0.7671 0.5314 0.8602
Wald c
2(10) 129.24 117.26 181.40
No. observations 1044 1044 1044
Note: Instrumented lagged dependent variable, all varaibles are in first differences. z is normally distributed.
Instruments used: growth, lagged growth, devwd, lagged devwd, oilpr, ppi, liberal, libppi and third lag of
the dependent variable
Table 11
Two-step estimation of a dynamic model with lags and instruments: Arellano-Bond estimation
Dependent variable












TBGDPIMF(-1) 0.4150 26.75 0.4668 35.50 0.4460 18.76
TBGDPIMF(-2) -0.1003 -13.57 -0.0059 -0.87 0.0345 2.00
GROWTH -0.0853 -7.28 -0.0120 -0.95 -0.1028 -9.94
GROWTH(-1) -0.0652 -5.93 -0.0133 -1.44 -0.1416 -12.79
DEVWD 0.2728 5.27 0.4192 18.18 0.3300 7.39
DEVWD(-1) -0.0602 -2.28 -0.1330 -4.54 0.0370 0.80
OILPR -0.0803 -8.18 -0.0042 -0.41 -0.0415 -5.39
PPI 0.0433 17.78 0.0394 6.30 0.0715 9.73
LIBERAL -2.4185 -1.43 -1.0652 -0.56 4.8119 1.77
LIBPPI 0.0608 0.54 -0.0112 -1.08 -0.0510 -3.25
REER 2.0643 3.69 1.6162 5.59 -0.2432 -0.28
CONSTANT -0.1592 -3.75 0.0152 0.39 -0.1310 -4.40
Sargan test c
2 (403)  39.79 43.89 43.94













2(11) 6613.65 6550.45 11561.80
No. observations 1087 1087 1087
Note: All variables are in first differences.36
Table 12
Three stage least square estimates for Asia, Africa and Latin America on time demeaned observations
using endogenous growth (Static Model)
Name of variable Africa
Dependent variable
TBGDPIMF    GROWTH
Asia
Dependent variable
TBGDPIMF     GROWTH
Latin America
Dependent variable















DEVWDD  0.6993                 0.0424
(4.70)                    (0.25)
1.8583                 0.7407
(3.78)                    (4.13)
0.8989                0.3248
(3.66)                  (2.28)
CONSTANT -0.1462               -0.0615
(-0.69)                 (-0.28)
0.709  0.0463
(0.13)                   (0.19)
-0.318                -0.0546
 (-0.10)                 (-0.30)
GDPLAG                             -0.0018
                             (-2.35)
                           -7.92x10
-6
                            (-1.67)
                         -0.00006
                            (-1.40)
OILPRICE                              0.0393
                             (0.05)
                             0.0902
                             (3.89)
                             -0.1023
                             (-4.54)
LIBERAL                             1.4184
                              (1.90)
                              1.5409
                              (2.80)
                              1.7961
                              (4.12)
RMSE 5.703                   5.9070 7.9309                   4.4072 7.4196                4.1909
c
2 264.012               8.057 39.1725
27.1029
24.5725               57.89
No. observations 725 319 522
No. countries 25 11 18
Note: Endogenous Variables: TBGDPIMF, GROWTH. Exogenous Variables: dewd, ppid, gdplag, oilpr,
liberal, oil, libedev.37
Table 13
Three stage least square estimates for Asia, Africa and Latin America
on time demaned observations using endogenous growth with current account to GDP





CAGDP         GROWTH
Asia
Dependent variable
CAGDP            GROWTH
Latin America
Dependent variable













DEVWDD 0.9082     -0.1682
(3.09)                    (-1.04)
-0.6174                    0.6384
(-1.01)                     (3.47)
0.3593                0.2293
(1.69)                  (1.62)
CONSTANT -0.0640               - 0.0045
(-0.15)                   (-0.02)
0.0300                    0.0572
(0.05)                       (0.23)
0.0698                -0.0408
 (0.25)                 (-0.22)
GDPLAG                              0.0008
                              (-1.40)
                             -0.00001
                               (-2.19)
                         -0.00008
                            (-1.73)
OILPRICE                             -0.0861
                             (-4.18)
                              0.0686
                               (2.50)
                             -0.1206
                             (-5.41)
LIBERAL                              0.4871
                              (1.06)
                              -0.2896
                              (-0.35)
                              1.0743
                              (2.50)
RMSE 12.286                  5.8931 11.6257                  4.3982 6.5553                4.1895
c
2 56.0091               18.0136 21.5542                 18.7913 44.6198               55.0525
No. observation 725 319 522
No. countries 25 11 18
Note: Endogenous variables: CAGDP, GROWTH. Exogenous Variables: dewd, ppid, gdplag, oilpr, liberal,
oil, libedev38
Figure 1
GDP-growth rates, merchandise trade-deficit/GDP ratio and current account/GDP ratio of developing
countries and territories, 1970–97, %. From UNCTAD database
Figure 2
Mean Values of 64 countries for each year on TBGDPIMF, CAGDP and GROWTH. Both TBGDPIMF
and CAGDP are deficits with positive signs. Negative values mean surplus on trade and current
account.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Burkina Faso 854 TBGDPIMF
CAGDP
TBGDP
GROWTH
-9.9447
-3.4397
-11.2036
3.9750
3.2743
3.6752
9.6886
3.4814
-16.3687
-12.8000
-21.5444
-1.7700
-2.0011
1.6644
15.2953
10.4700
Uruguay 858 TBGDPIMF
CAGDP
TBGDP
GROWTH
-0.5938
-1.9839
-0.6892
2.3486
3.5276
2.4012
3.5895
4.1893
-7.4040
-7.3841
-6.1360
-9.3900
5.0838
2.8784
5.0668
8.8600
Total TBGDPIMF
CAGDP
TBGDP
GROWTH
-6.0581
-5.4156
-7.7960
3.5980
11.1496
9.0713
11.3761
5.4913
-73.8215
-101.8735
-72.4817
-49.5000
34.4877
27.182
42.1077
36.6000